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Introduction
Are public transit authorities allowed to censor from their public buses an advertisement denying the existence of god? What about a pro-life advertisement depicting an aborted fetus or advertising that quotes Leviticus 20:13? These are the types of issues with which transit authorities' have begun, and will undoubtedly continue, to * Trudeau Scholar, JSD(c). Thank-you to Richard Devlin, Dianne Pothier and Scott Campbell for their very helpful comments. I would like to acknowledge the generous funding provided by the Trudeau Foundation and SSHRC during the writing of this paper. face in light of the Supreme Court of Canada's recently released decision 1 upholding expressive rights to private advertising on publicly owned property.
In Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority v. Canadian Federation of
Students the Court struck down Vancouver transit authority policies that stipulated that advertising on public buses could not have political or controversial content. BC Transit and Translink, both determined by the Supreme Court of Canada to be government actors for purposes of Charter application, had for a number of years earned revenues by selling advertising space on their buses. The Court's determination that section 2(b) of the Charter prohibits transit authorities from excluding controversial content from the advertising spaces that they sell, confirms that the sale of advertising by government entities has opened a can of worms that in hindsight many of those government entities might have preferred left unopened. The Court determined that while government actors can justifiably censor offensive content from the advertising space that they sell, they cannot justifiably censor controversial content. The forecasted problems to come, such as those suggested in the opening paragraph, will stem from the difficulty in determining a was what was at issue in Vancouver Transportation) they draw conclusions and make suggestions (such as the suggestion that courts might rely on community standards of tolerance to define offensiveness) which, when considered in the context of advocacy advertising, are problematic.
There is an additional analytical difficulty with the majority's decision in
Vancouver Transportation Authority. This difficulty stems from the analytical framework that they adopt to address the transit authorities' assertions that the claim made by the respondents would place a positive obligation on the government. The respondents, the Canadian Federation of Students and the British Columbia Teacher's Federation, had both tried to purchase bus advertising space encouraging citizens to vote in the upcoming provincial election. The transit authorities' policies permitted commercial but not political or controversial advertising on buses and they refused to post the advertisements on this basis. The respondents challenged the policies as a violation of their section 2(b) expressive rights. In response, the transit authorities argued that what the respondents were claiming was a positive right to a government created means of expression. As discussed below, the Court has in prior cases determined that claims for an expressive right that can be characterized as a claim of underinclusion in a government created platform for expression (a claim for a positive right) will only be protected in very limited circumstances. As such, a lot can turn on whether a claim is one which will fall under the Court's positive rights section 2(b) analysis. Unfortunately, in this case, in determining what types of section 2(b) cases will engage a positive rights analysis (an analysis which severely limits the scope of protection under section 2(b)) the majority relies on a puzzling and potentially problematic analytical distinction between excluding speakers (restrictions targeted at groups) and excluding speeches (restrictions targeted at content).
The first part of this discussion will examine and critique the majority's approach to determining whether a particular claim is for a positive right under section 2(b). The second part of the discussion will consider their section 1 analysis and the difficulty with the suggestion that distinctions between offensive (justifiably censored) advertising and controversial (unjustifiably censored) advertising on government owned property be made based on community notions of public decency.
I. Section 2(b) Analysis
The majority divided its section 2(b) analysis into two sections. The first section of their analysis addressed the transit authorities' argument that the respondents were seeking to gain access to a particular government created platform for expression and that this claim of underinclusion, were it successful, would place government entities under a positive obligation with respect to the respondents' expressive rights. In other words, the transit authorities argued that the respondents' claim for a right to the advertising space triggered the 'positive rights' analysis that the Court has adopted in prior cases. Section 2(b), but for the exceptional circumstances discussed below, does not protect claims characterized as seeking a positive right. After rejecting the transit authorities'
suggestion regarding the positive nature of the right claimed, the majority determined that the method or location of the expression (advertising on the sides of government owned buses) did not remove the prima facie protection of section 2(b) -as dictated by the test adopted by the Court in Montreal (City) v. 2952 -1366 It is the first part of the majority's section 2(b) analysis -the part addressing the issue of positive rights to government created platforms of expression -that will be focused on in the paragraphs to follow.
As noted above, the transit authorities in this case argued that the respondents'
claim to purchase bus advertisements should be characterized as a positive right to inclusion in a particular government created means, or platform for, expression. After acknowledging the traditionally generous and purposive but not unlimited interpretation of rights and freedoms guaranteed under the Charter, the majority began its section 2(b)
analysis by noting that the government is not typically under an obligation to provide individuals with a particular means of expression. 4 "Thus where the government creates such a means, it is generally entitled to determine which speakers are allowed to 3 [2005] 3 SCR 141 [hereinafter City of Montreal] at para. 74. In City of Montreal, the Court determined that restrictions to the scope of protection for expressive rights on government property should be assessed based on whether the place is a "public place where one would expect constitutional protection for free expression on the basis that expression in that place does not conflict with the purposes which s. 2(b) is intended to serve, namely (1) democratic discourse, (2) truth finding and (3) self-fulfillment." In answering that question courts are to consider the historical or actual function of the place and whether there are other aspects of the place to suggest that expression within it would undermine the values underlying freedom of expression. As an aside, this test is somewhat confusing. It almost suggests dueling zones/scopes of expressive protection. It works for the example of the Prime Minister's office but is less sensible in the context, for example, of the air traffic control tower. Is it really that section 2(b) protection does not extend to the air traffic control tower because expression in that place would conflict with the promotion of democratic discourse and truth finding given the air traffic control tower's actual function or rather is it that we do not want airplanes to crash? This question raises a separate issue with section 2(b) which is not the focus of this paper and which was the source of debate in the Court's earlier decisions on section 2(b) (see for example Justice Lamer's approach and Justice L'Heureux-Dube's approach in Committee for the Commonwealth of Canada v. Canada, [1991] There is a second problem related to the analytical significance that the majority attributes to the distinction between restricting groups or individuals and restricting content. The majority's reasoning implies that where the policy (or law or government act) restricts the content of what can be expressed in a government platform, the narrowed scope of the protected freedom, as determined by the Baier/ Dunmore criteria, 14 There is a question as to whether it was even appropriate in Baier to apply the Dunmore analysis (established in the context of section 2(d) rights to associate) to claims under section 2(b). There is a qualitative distinction between the nature of group oriented claims of association and claims of freedom to expression that suggests the same analysis ought not to apply regardless. However, if the majority meant to address this issue they ought to have done so by overruling Baier and determining that Dunmore be limited to association rights not by suggesting that Dunmore only be applied in expression cases involving groups! does not apply. 15 In other words, the decision suggests that an expressive right that is restricted based on content never falls under a positive rights type analysis regardless as to the government means or platform claimed. This is also problematic. In this case it is the right to access a government created space for private advertising.
In his concurring opinion Justice Fish, who dissented from the majority in Baier, adopted an analysis that does exactly this -his approach is based on an examination of the claim itself rather than on the nature of the restriction. He adopted a more direct approach to rejecting the transit authorities assertion that a positive rights (Baier/Dunmore) analysis ought to be applied. Justice Fish suggested that courts ought toconsider whether the freedom of expression claimed would impose on the government "a significant burden of assistance, in the form of expenditure of public funds or the initiation of a complex legislative, regulatory or administrative scheme or undertaking".
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The approach to section 2(b) and the 'positive rights argument' advanced below is similar to the one adopted by Justice Fish -although it would potentially result in a more restrictive standard as to when Baier/Dunmore applies than would Justice Fish's approach. 21 The approach suggested in the paragraphs to follow is that i) the issue should be characterized based on the nature of the claim not the nature of the restriction (unlike what the majority did) and ii) that the Baier/ Dunmore analysis should only apply where the claim fits within one of the two types of claims for which this principle regarding positive rights under section 2(b) was established and is typically found.
If the claim is of the sort in which this notion about 'positive rights' under section 2(b) was developed, the Baier/Dunmore criteria should apply. If it is not one of these two types of claims (discussed below) then the regular City of Montreal approach to expressive rights on public property should be adopted. This will ensure a limited application of the very restricted guarantee provided for under the Baier/Dunmore criteria without resorting to the problematic reasoning adopted by the majority in Vancouver Transportation.
The cases in which a section 2(b) argument has been denied on the basis that the claimant seeks a positive right not obligated by the government have typically been one of two types. The first category of cases in which expressive rights have been denied on the basis that the claim places a positive obligation on the government not required by the Constitution are cases involving claims for a right to be consulted by the government -a right to have the ear of law or policy makers if others have been given that ear. In other words, a claim that section 2(b) requires that where the government has created a means or forum for the government to access or receive opinion or information than the government is required to hear about every opinion or viewpoint, or from every group or individual seeking to be consulted. The audience in these types of cases is small -it is either the government or some narrowly defined audience created by the government. In fact, it was a case of this nature in which the Court first determined that section 2(b) does not generally guarantee a right to government created platforms of expression. The case was Haig v. Canada and it involved a claimed right to vote in a referendum. 22 While the right to vote in federal and provincial elections is constitutionally protected under section 3 of the Charter, the right to vote in referendums, public opinion polls, or plebiscites is not. The Court was clear in Haig that, provided it is not done discriminatorily, the government can seek public opinion -consult with the public or a segment of the public -by whatever method it chooses. Section 2(b) does not circumscribe the government's ability to choose its sources of expertise, advice and opinion.
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It is significant to note that a denied right to government consultation was the context in which the principle that there is no general obligation on the part of the government to provide access to government created means of, or platforms for, expression, was established by the Court.
Indeed, many of the cases in which a right to expression through a government created platform have been denied are of this consultation genre. In Siemens v.
Manitoba, for example, the Court found that there was no section 2(b) right to be included in a referendum on prohibiting Video Lottery Terminals. 24 In Allman v.
Northwest Territories (Commissioner) the court of appeal upheld a three-year residency requirement to vote in a plebiscite on whether the North West Territories should be divided. The court followed the ruling in Haig that, in seeking public opinion on an issue, the government is not constitutionally obligated to seek everyone's opinion. 25 In NWAC, discussed above, the Court held that section 2(b) does not constrain the government in its choice of advisors or require the government to hear every viewpoint.
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There have been two decisions that one could characterize as of this genre but with somewhat of a deviation from the typical government consultation category of cases. In these cases the government itself was not the audience for the platform.
However, the claim in these cases was for access to a narrowly defined audience created by the government to carry out government related functions. It seems reasonable to very narrowly define the scope of protected expression in cases where claimants are demanding the government's ear or asking the government to spend money so that one can express oneself. With respect to these types of claims a positive rights Baier/Dunmore analysis may be appropriate. Such an approach leaves at least some space for recognition of those circumstances in which without a government sponsored megaphone or an audience with the government, a de facto gag is produced; however, it also leaves the government relatively free to consult with whomever it sees fit 32 and unrestrained in its discretion (in this context) to allocate funds as it deems appropriate. Application of the Braier/Dumore criteria and discussion about positive government obligations, positive rights, government created platforms and degree of government action required should be confined to the types of claims in which the principle that the government is under no obligation to provide for a particular means of expression was introduced -claims of entitlement to the government's ear or the government's purse.
In Vancouver Transportation the majority rightly clarifies that "if government support or enablement were all that was required to trigger a 'positive rights analysis", it could be argued that a claim brought by demonstrators seeking access to a public park should be dealt with under the Baier analysis…" 33 But they then go on to confuse the issue by stating that "[w]hen the reasons in Baier are read as a whole, it is clear that "support or enablement" must be tied to a claim requiring the government to provide a 32 There are of course instances where the government is under a duty to consult -such as the constitutionally protected requirement that they consult with aboriginal groups whose potential treaty or aboriginal rights are at stake. As well, a government that acts discriminatorily in its decisions regarding consultation and funding for expression continues to be subject to the equality protections guaranteed under section 15. 33 Supra note 1 at para. 34. particular means of expression." 34 Surely a claim for enablement to access a particular government created means of expression is not enough to trigger a positive rights analysis? The problem is that without something more this 'test' for triggering Baier does not avoid the very point the majority had just made regarding claims to demonstrate in a public park. Wouldn't a request for a permit to hold a demonstration on the public stage in a government owned park be considered a claim that the government enable one to express oneself through a particular government created means? The majority would agree that such a claim ought not to trigger Baier/Dunmore.
They go on to drawn the questionable conclusion that the respondents "are not requesting that the government support or enable their expressive activity by providing them with a particular means of expression from which they are excluded." Really? Are they not? This conclusion on the part of the majority turns wholly on the distinction they draw between speakers and speech; once one acknowledges that this is more of a distinction without a difference, the assertion that claimants who are requesting that the government sell them advertising space on public buses are not requesting that the government enable their expressive activity by providing them with a particular means of expression from which they have been excluded, becomes hollow.
Attempting to characterize a claim based on the restriction or the alleged under inclusivity at issue, rather than identifying whether what is being sought is of the same ilk as the type of claim in which this principle was established, creates the difficult (to the point of arbitrary) task of trying to parse out the difference between positive versus negative action, enablement versus enablement tied to a particular means of expression, Baier/Dunmore analysis was intended to apply. The majority ought to have assessed the nature of the claim and rejected a positive rights approach on that basis rather than examining the nature of the restriction, making distinctions between the speaker and the speech and then engaging in an analysis that attempts to parse out in some principled manner the distinction between government action and inaction, or enablement tied to government created means versus general enablement.
There are a number of factors that a court ought to consider in an assessment as to whether a claim requires the Baier/Dunmore analysis. A court ought to consider the intended audience, the cost to the government and perhaps the government's purpose in creating the particular means at issue. Where an assessment of these factors indicates that a claim is qualitatively similar to the types of claims (for the government's ear or the government's purse) in which the principle regarding access to government platforms was established, then the Baier/Dunmore analysis could be applied. Where the claim is not for a right to be consulted by the government or for a right to government funding then on that basis alone the Baier/Dunmore analysis, regardless of the nature of the restriction, should not be applied.
The Court's approach to Baier is not the only difficulty with the decision in
Vancouver Transportation. As suggested above, the Court's discussion regarding justification for the section 2(b) violation under section 1 also raises potential issues.
II. The Court's Section 1 Analysis
Having determined that the transit authorities' policies violated section 2(b) of the Charter, the majority turned to section 1 to determined whether this violation could be justified. They determined that although the transit authorities' policies were proscribed by law, the policies were not justified in a free and democratic society. The specific language of the contested policies was as follows:
2. Advertisements, to be accepted, shall be limited to those which communicate information concerning goods, services, public service announcements and public events.
7. No advertisement will be accepted which is likely, in the light of prevailing community standards, to cause offence to any person or group of persons or create controversy; 9. No advertisement will be accepted which advocates or opposes any ideology or political philosophy, point of view, policy or action, or which conveys information about a political meeting, gathering or event, a political party or the candidacy of any person for a political position or public office.
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The majority held that while the policies were adopted for a sufficiently important objective -to provide a safe and welcoming public transit system -the limits created by the policies were not rationally connected to this objective. They stated that it is not the political nature of an advertisement that creates a dangerous or hostile environment. Rather, it is only if the advertisement is offensive in that, for example, its content is discriminatory or it advocates violence or terrorismregardless of whether it is commercial or political in nature -that the objective of providing a safe and welcoming transit system will be undermined.
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According to their reasoning the line to be drawn is between offensive and inoffensive advertisements -it is only a restriction on offensive content that will be rationally connected to the objective of providing a safe and welcoming public transit system.
The Court went on to determine that even had there been a rational connection between the objective and the limits imposed by articles 2, 7 and 9, they would have found them to be unreasonable and disproportionate. Recall, Article 2 excluded political advertisements and Article 9 prohibited all political advertising, making them overly broad according to the Court. Article 7 excluded any advertisement that was likely to cause offence to any person or group of persons or create controversy, as determined by the prevailing community standards of tolerance. The Court concluded that Article 7 was also unnecessarily broad. "While a community standard of tolerance may constitute a reasonable limit on offensive advertisements, excluding advertisements which "create controversy" is unnecessarily broad." 38 Again, it is only offensive advertising that will undermine the objective of a safe and welcoming transit system. Citizens, they concluded, are expected to put up with some controversy in a free and democratic society. As the majority notes, the fact that the policies in this case are overly broad and not rationally connected to their objective does not mean that the government cannot limit speech in public transit advertisements. The difficulty with their section 1 analysis is that the only guidance it provides for how the government might place those limits -that is draw the line between offensive and merely controversial content -is the community standards of tolerance test. While they do not outright adopt the community standards of tolerance test they suggest twice that this may be the appropriate standard. Moreover, it is the only possible standard that they discuss.
It is first suggested in their discussion regarding the over breadth of Article 7. The only indication of how to approach this question revealed in the Court's decision is their implicit endorsement of the community standards of tolerance test -a standard that has finally been rejected in the very line of cases that they cite as authority for the principle that the government can constitutionally place criminal prohibitions on speech (or action) based on the location where the expression is to occur and the audience to which it will be directed. 44 Not only do they suggest that an assessment of what a significant segment of the public would consider decent may be an appropriate measure as to what constitutes a justifiable limit on expression in this context but it is presumably the community standards of tolerance test as it stood in the earlier obscenity and indecency cases rather than in its later post-Butler harm based version. That is to say, a standard based on an assessment as to what the community would tolerate others viewing or hearing rather than an assessment as to what the community would tolerate in terms of harm arising from such expression. The latter harm based community standard, purported by courts in the obscenity context to be more objective, would be a more onerous standard for the government to meet under section 1; it was not referred to by the Court and is not referred to in the Canadian Code of Advertising Standards (to which, as noted above, they also referred McLachlin determined that indecency should be defined based on constitutional values such as autonomy, liberty, equality and human dignity rather than an assessment as to the degree of harm that the community would tolerate arising from a particular sexual behavior.
that the standard is not based on harm but rather based on notions of propriety and decency.
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Allowing the government to rely on the 'standards of public decency prevailing among a significant segment of the population' as a yardstick to justify content based limits on access to government created means of expression is problematic. For the purposes of circumscribing constitutional freedoms and protections, determining what is offensive should not be done based on majoritarian notions of decency. This risks both justifying government censorship based on majoritarian attitudes and perspectives as well as failing to protect an 'insignificant segment of the population' from content that the majority of the population would not find offensive.
It is one thing for an independent self-regulatory agency founded by the advertising industry or an individual broadcaster, newspaper, or billboard owner to censor content based on their assessment of what a "significant segment of the population" considers decent. Provided this is done in a manner that does not contravene human rights code protections, private actors are entitled to censor advertising in whatever manner best suits their business or personal interests. It is quite another matter however, to allow the government to justify content-based limits on the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression on the basis of an adjudicator's subjective assessment 45 See for example a 2009 determination of the Council upholding a complaint that an advertisement which depicted two women kissing passionately was highly offensive and inappropriate for viewing during family programming and therefore violated clause 14 prohibiting unacceptable portrayals and depictions on the basis that they would disregard prevailing standards of decency among a significant segment of the population. Had the advertisement not been shown during family programming the complaint would not have been upheld ( as to what the majority of Canadians or a significant segment of Canadians consider decent.
In the context of criminally regulating obscenity and indecency, the courts ultimately determined that the community standards of tolerance test was too subjectivethat it would not ensure against a judge substituting his or her own moral perspective or degree of tolerance for that of the community's perspective or degree of tolerance. This is why the notion of harm was eventually incorporated into the doctrine 46 and in part why the community standards test was eventually rejected.
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Even assuming that it were possible for a judge to accurately and objectively asses the community's sense of decency, it is questionable whether this should be the constitutional marker used to determine as between what the government can justifiably censor on the basis that it is offensive and what must be permitted as merely controversial. Take for example the facts in Re Vancouver Sun and Gay Alliance. 48 In this 1979 case the Vancouver Sun refused to include in their classified section an advertisement promoting a magazine entitled "Gay Tide". They refused on the grounds that (1) homosexuality is offensive to public decency and that the advertisement would offend some of its subscribers; (2) that the Code of Advertising Standards, a Code of Advertising Ethics subscribed to by most of the daily newspapers in Canada includes the following section: "Public decency--no advertisement shall be prepared, or be knowingly accepted which is vulgar, suggestive or in any way offensive to public decency" and that the advertisement in question did not conform to the standards therein set out; and; (3) that the Appellant newspaper had a duty to protect the morals of the community. [t]he subject-matter of homosexuals or homosexuality is so notorious that some degree of judicial notice may be taken of the subject-matter. Many people in our society may well entertain a bias or some predisposition against homosexuals or homosexuality on moral and/or religious grounds. It cannot therefore be justly said that a bias so held has no reasonable foundation.
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It is likely that in 1977 a significant segment of the public did consider homosexuality indecent. It is even more likely that regardless, it would be reasonable for the newspaper to assume this and correspondingly decide to refuse the advertisement. A newspaper, 50 I am indebted to Dianne Pothier for pointing out to me that at that time grounds of discrimination were not an essential element of a human rights complaint in British Columbia. 51 The Supreme Court of Canada found that the provision on unreasonably denying services to the public did not apply to classified advertising. Regardless, as Professor Bruce Ryder points out, Justice Martland "seemed to suggest that the Sun was free to take a position on "the controversial subject of homosexuality" and reject the ad on the basis of its opposition to equal rights for gay men and lesbians." See Bruce Ryder, "Family Status, Sexuality and "The Province of the 57 The modifications to the test have made it more confusing -not because of her liberty two step but because it now seems to rely on the notion of two competing spheres of protected expression. See supra note 2 for a discussion on this point.
conflict with the purposes which s.2(b) is intended to serve, namely (1) democratic discourse (2) truth finding and (3) self-fulfillment.
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If fundamental values such as self-fulfillment, autonomy, equality, liberty and human dignity can be applied to determine whether a particular sexual act in a particular location constitutes one of indecency for purposes of the criminal law, and whether the scope of religious freedom extends to a particular religious activity, can these same principles be applied to determine whether a particular advertisement on a public transit system is offensive?
iii) Location, Location, Location as liberty, autonomy, equality, and respect for human dignity -that she has identified in defining indecency for the purposes of the criminal law or in guiding the scope of protection for religious freedom in a multicultural society would be applicable. While the assessment of these values, and the factors relied upon to assess them, will be different when considering religious freedom, the reach of the criminal law and advocacy advertising on government owned property, the analytical framework could likely be the same. So for example, the limits placed on what the government can criminally prohibit as indecent sexual activity 59 will likely be greater than the limits on what they can justifiably censor from public bus advertisements; however the values (equality, dignity, autonomy and liberty) and the factors (such as location and potential audience) used to determine these limits will be the same.
As the majority noted in Vancouver Transportation, location matters, as does audience. 60 At issue in this context are two locations, and two types of audiences -both of which create circumstances of unwilling/involuntary exposure to members of the public. The audiences are the general public and transit users. The locations are advertisements placed on the outsides of buses and advertisements placed on the insides of buses. Citizens at large will be involuntarily exposed to advertisements on the outside of buses in a fashion similar to the way one is involuntarily exposed to protestors when one drives on a public road or the way one is involuntarily exposed to a parade as it passes by them. In each of these instances the exposure is limited and likely brief and in most cases citizens would have the ability to avert their eyes without much difficulty. 59 While Labaye was a case on statutory interpretation not a constitutional challenge, it was certainly informed by and considered in light of, those constitutional issues that would arise in a Charter challenge to the criminal regulation of sexual activity. 60 See also Canada (Attorney General) v. JTI-MacDonald Corp., [2007] 2 SCR 610.
Transit users will also be exposed only briefly -although perhaps repeatedly -to advertisements on the sides of buses. However, transit users will also be forced to ride on buses knowing what is on the outside of them.
Advertisements on the insides of buses are somewhat different. While members of the public at large will not be exposed to them, transit users will be involuntarily exposed and likely for longer periods and with less ability to simply 'not look at them'.
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In Labaye Chief Justice McLachlin determined that activities which cause (1) harm to those whose autonomy and liberty may be restricted by being confronted with inappropriate conduct; (2) harm to society by predisposing others to anti-social conduct;
and (3) harm to individuals participating in the conduct, would be indecent on the basis that such harm threatens those fundamental values reflected in the Constitution.
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As noted, the bar for activities that will be criminally prohibited on the basis that they are indecent will likely be higher than would be the standard for determining what content might be advertised on the sides of public buses. driving as a privilege rather than a right, arguing that those unable for religious reasons to comply with provincial driver's licence requirements could take the bus. Use of the taxpayer funded public transit system should be thought of more as a right than a privilege. It is reasonable to suggest that individual transit users who choose to ride the bus have nonetheless been involuntarily exposed to whatever advertisements are posted on the inside of the bus. 62 Supra note 44.
Consider again the three examples suggested above. First, consider an advertisement denying the existence of God. Placed on the outside of a bus it is unlikely that such an ad would constitute a serious enough moral assault such that it could be said to have impacted the autonomy and liberty of those who were involuntarily but briefly exposed to it. It seems unlikely that people would avoid streets where public buses travel. The same might reasonably be concluded with respect to the pro-life advertisement. However, if placed on the inside of the bus the analysis would be different with respect to both of these advertisements. It seems quite plausible that many people would avoid riding on a bus in which they would be forced to sit across from the image of an aborted fetus or that people would refuse to send their children to school on a bus in which they would be inundated with the message that they could be good without God. Such circumstances would certainly circumscribe their liberty and autonomy.
Would either of these advertisements -placed on the outsides of buses-undermine respect for and the dignity of a targeted group such that fundamental societal values would be threatened? It is unlikely that the humanist ad could be said to perpetuate this type of harm. Whether the pro-life advertisement could be said to do this might depend on its content. Perhaps the controversial ad with the depiction of an aborted fetus would not cause this type of harm but it might be reasonable to suggest that a declaration that abortion is murder would undermine the dignity and respect of a targeted groupwomen. Now consider the example of the advertisement quoting Leviticus 20:13: "If a man lies with a man as one lies with a woman, both of them have done what is detestable.
They must be put to death; their blood will be on their own heads." As is the case with respect to the other two examples, it seems unlikely that the placement of such an advertisement on the side of a bus would adversely affect citizens' liberty or autonomy to the degree contemplated in Labaye. It may be however, that an advertisement on the side of a public bus suggesting death to all homosexuals could undermine respect for and the dignity of gay, lesbian and transgender Canadians. It is also plausible that gay and lesbian transit users would feel less at liberty to take public transit should such a message confront them as they ride to work or school.
The approach just suggested is not without difficulties. It still requires a subjective assessment on the part of the court as to what level of harm to autonomy, liberty, equality and dignity is required to justify this type of government censorship. Whether one finds it a preferable approach to the one suggested by the Court in Vancouver Transportation turns simply on whether one would prefer that determinations as to what content the government can justifiably censor from public bus advertising be based on an adjudicator's assessment of what will (or will not) offend majoritarian notions of decency or on an adjudicator's assessment of the potential harm to the autonomy, liberty, equality and dignity of the public posed by the advertisement.
